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DEBATE CLUB 1/9/06
HOW WILL ALITO AND ROBERTS SHAPE THE COURT?
Joshua I. Schwartz and Brian K. Landsberg debate.
This Week's Entries: Monday | Tuesday | Wednesday | Thursday | Friday
Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Supreme Court nominee Samuel A. Alito, Jr. have many things in
common—they're both Ivy Leaguers, each was a sitting federal judge when nominated, they share a respect
for judicial pragmatism. Perhaps more important, both also worked for the Office of the Solicitor General
where they fought hard for conservative causes, from overruling Roe to limiting the Voting Rights Act.
Those who know the SG's office best believe that it shapes lawyers in significant ways. What would it mean
to have these two lawyers who practiced there on the Supreme Court?
Joshua I. Schwartz is Professor of Law at the George Washington University Law School and served in the Office of
the Solicitor General from 1981 to 1985. Brian K. Landsberg is Professor of Law at the McGeorge School of Law
and served in the Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division from 1964 until 1986.
Schwartz: 1/9/06, 10:02 AM
I am pleased to have this opportunity, together with
Professor Brian Landsberg, to explore the impact of service
in the Solicitor General's Office upon the qualifications of a
nominee for the Supreme Court of the United States.
Brian, let me start with some background facts about Judge
Alito and Justice Roberts, revealing significant differences,
as well as similarities:
Judge Samuel Alito was an Assistant to the Solicitor General
from 1981-1985. An Assistant to the S.G. is a line attorney
and not a political appointee. Alito served for five years in
this small office that handles, among other things, the federal
government's litigation in the Supreme Court of the United
States, before he moved on to a political appointment as a
Deputy Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel. Alito
was hired for the competitive position as an Assistant to the
S.G. from the job of top appellate Assistant United States
Attorney in the District of New Jersey. Alito's qualifications
for the job as Assistant to the S.G. were typical of those hired
in the office, and his workload in the office generally was a
typical one. With the exception of a handful of politically
sensitive "agenda" cases that Alito handled, there was little
to distinguish Alito from any other assistant.
Chief Justice John Roberts also served in the Solicitor
General's office, but in a somewhat different capacity. He
was the Principal Deputy Solicitor General from October
1989 until January 1993—for most of the term of President
George H.W. Bush. The position that Roberts held was
known at one time as that of the "political deputy." Indeed,
the position was first created in Ronald Reagan's second
term because of concern that the senior Deputy Solicitor

General, a career civil servant, lacked a demonstrable
commitment to the President's political and legal values.
When the Solicitor General was for some reason recused
from a particular case or when the S.G. needed politicallysympathetic counsel, the Principal Deputy Solicitor General
would fulfill that role. Although this was Roberts' job for his
term in the Solicitor General's office, press accounts indicate
that his tenure was distinguished by little visible political
influence.
Brian, I think our readers are entitled to know several things
about where I am coming from with regard to Judge Alito. I
worked together with Sam Alito in the S.G.'s office as a
fellow assistant from 1981-1985, and I counted Sam as a
friend. On the other hand, I consider myself to be a liberal
democrat. Based on what I now know, I support his
confirmation.
To get the debate going, let me introduce here propositions
that I hope to elaborate on in subsequent postings:
Much of the work of Assistants to the Solicitor General is to
evaluate cases for appeal and certiorari, turning many
down—over the objections of other government lawyers—for
a host of reasons. This job is distinguished by the degree to
which the job calls for the exercise of judgment, rather than
the exercise of advocacy skills. It is very good training for the
bench.
The work of Assistants in the Solicitor General's office trains
them in a kind of incrementalist/gradualist approach to the
law that emphasizes strong respect for precedent. In another
era, this approach would be considered conservative
lawyering.
Sam Alito, came naturally to this kind of conservative
lawyering, and practiced it throughout his tenure in the S.G.'s
Office, including in the rare, but significant, "agenda" cases
that he handled.
Because of the way he conducted himself as an assistant,
movement conservatives like Ed Meese by 1985 likely had
real doubts as to whether Alito was "one of them." I suspect
that this is what impelled Alito to write the honest, but
surprisingly pointed 1985 "job memo" when he applied for
the more political job in the Office of Legal Counsel.
Landsberg: 1/9/06, 01:24 PM
Joshua, thank you for setting the stage for our
discussion of the impact of service in the Solicitor
General's office upon the qualifications of a nominee for
the Supreme Court of the United States.
I think you have shown one important distinction
between Judge Alito's service in the S.G.'s office and
Chief Justice Roberts' service as the political deputy. I
would like to elaborate on a couple of other points you
made.
First, Alito was, indeed, a line attorney, not a political
appointee. As you know, Joshua, there are two types of

line attorney in the Solicitor General's office. Most, like
Judge Alito and you, come to the job for a few years
and then move on. For them, the job is a training ground
and a stepping stone. Others, such as longtime deputy
Solicitor General Lawrence Wallace and assistants Irv
Gornstein and Ed Kneedler, make a career of the job.
All, however, are distinguished by their strong
credentials, which generally include serving on a top law
review and clerking on a federal court of appeals.
Two questions are implicit in our topic. First, do the
positions Alito took as an Assistant to the Solicitor
General shed light on his likely positions in Supreme
Court cases if he is confirmed? Second, does the
experience of serving as an Assistant to the Solicitor
General strengthen his qualifications as a Supreme
Court nominee?
Joshua, you've made an important point in telling us
that much of the work of the assistants is to evaluate
cases for appeal and certiorari. Indeed, this is the one
aspect of the Solicitor General's staff's work that can be
clearly attributed to one person rather than to a team.
The briefs that the S.G.'s office files are team products,
reflecting the work of agency lawyers, Justice
Department litigating division lawyers, Assistants to the
Solicitor General, the Deputy Solicitor General, and the
Solicitor General. They shed little light on personal
views. However, the recommendations whether to
appeal or petition for certiorari are made by individuals
and then reviewed up the line. They shed more light on
personal views.
My own experience dealing with Sam Alito came as a
result of my job as Chief of the Appellate Section of the
Civil Rights Division. We co-authored a brief in an
important affirmative action case, and I could not say
who contributed what ideas to that brief. However, I also
recall with some concern one of his recommendations.
In 1984, Alito considered whether the Solicitor General
should file an amicus brief in Memphis Police
Department v. Garner, on the question whether the
Memphis police violated the Constitution when they shot
in the back a fleeing unarmed 15 year old burglar. As
you note, Alito took a conservative approach; here, that
meant he recommended against filing the brief, because
United States law enforcement practices were not at
stake, just the practices of some states. What disturbed
me about his recommendation, however, was that his
substantive analysis glossed over the real human
tragedy represented by the unnecessary death of this
youth, and that he brushed off the argument of staff
attorneys in the Civil Rights Division that the shooting
amounted to summary punishment, without due process
of law. The memorandum reflected careful and thorough
legal analysis, but very little understanding of the real
world impact of the Memphis practice. My reaction at
the time was to write that his approach "would literally
destroy one of our most effective civil rights
enforcement programs...."
This Week's Entries: Monday | Tuesday | Wednesday | Thursday | Friday

Schwartz: 1/10/06, 05:52 PM
Brian, in your initial posting you broke out two questions to
consider—eventually: (1) Whether the positions that Alito
took as an Assistant to the S.G. tell us something useful
about his likely positions as a Supreme Court Justice? and
(2) Whether the experience of serving as an Assistant to the
S.G. strengthens Alito's qualifications as a Supreme Court
nominee? For reasons of space, no doubt, your Monday
posting then focuses exclusively on aspects of the first
question.
Let me start today with the second question, though I get to
the first at the end of this posting. I suspect that—from an
inside the Beltway perspective—one of the least
controversial things I said in my initial posting is that the work
of assistants to the S.G. is fine training for the bench. For
those who have a different background, however, this
deserves some elaboration.
At least half of the time of assistants in the S.G.'s office is
spent on evaluating decisions adverse to the government as
possible candidates for appeal, or rehearing en banc by a
court of appeals, or a cert petition to the Supreme Court.
Many or these recommendations made by Assistants to the
SG are against seeking further review, even though a
government agency and/or lawyers elsewhere in the
Department of Justice have recommended the appeal, en
banc, or cert petition. An assistant's recommendations
against seeking further review in such a case that the
government has lost will generally reflect one or more of the
following conclusions by the assistant to the S.G.:
. that the government's position argued in the lower courts
is wrong;
. that the government has failed to preserve (by raising them
in the lower courts) key arguments that ideally should be
made on appeal;
. that the government has failed to make a factual record in
the lower courts that is necessary to support legal arguments
that ideally ought to be made on further review in a case of
its kind;
. that the government's prospects of success in further
appellate review are seriously compromised by poor
lawyering by the government lawyers at earlier stages of the
proceedings;
. that the facts of the particular case make it an unattractive
"vehicle" for advancing the legal arguments that the
government would like to advance in a case of its kind; the
risk is excessive that the case will become a "hard case that
makes bad law"; or
. that the government's position is at best of uncertain
strength on the law, and seeking further review accordingly
would be an unwise expenditure of the government's limited
number of "slots" for seeking certiorari or its limited fund of
credibility with the Supreme Court.
Assistants to the SG are trained in applying these criteria.
They get used to delivering unwelcome recommendations to
government clients and lawyers. Some of these conclusions
require a kind of independent judgment, the exercise of
which is very good preparation for a future judge or justice.

Others involve the ability to think strategically with a long
term horizon as to how best ultimately to establish the
government's legal objectives. Still others entail the ability to
think about the long run interests of the government, and to
moderate the short term policy-driven judgments of the
incumbent administration in the White House. Alito clearly
has all of these capabilities and abundant experience in their
exercise in difficult cases.
Brian, now we are approaching the first issue you identified
in your Monday posting. In some instances that have gotten
attention in the media, including Alito's memos about official
immunity and Roe v. Wade, Alito is being criticized from the
liberal side for memos written in exercising the casewinowing responsibilities that I am describing. (I am not
attributing this to you, of course, Brian.) He is criticized for
these memos even though Alito was actually attempting—not
always successfully—to moderate the position that the
government was going to take. Although one can learn from
his corpus of memoranda, taken as a whole, that Alito is
inclined to be quite a conservative judge, one has to be very
cautious in drawing any strong conclusions from these
memos about what Alito's own positions as a Supreme Court
Justice would be on specific matters.
This Week's Entries: Monday | Tuesday | Wednesday | Thursday | Friday
Landsberg: 1/11/06, 09:10 AM
Joshua, let's explore further your point that the work an
assistant to the Solicitor General performs strengthens
Judge Alito's qualifications as a Supreme Court
nominee. I suppose the ideal Supreme Court Justice
has superb technical skills and the ability to distinguish
long term interests from short term policy-driven
judgments. The Solicitor General's office does indeed
train its lawyers in both the technical side and the
balancing of long term and short term interests. I do
think, however, that the ideal Supreme Court Justice
must also possess more than just technical skill and the
ability to distinguish the long term from the short term.
Here we encounter an anomaly. The other qualities we
look for in a Supreme Court Justice are more akin to
what we might look for in a Solicitor General or Attorney
General, rather than in one of their assistants. For the
Solicitor General and Attorney General must act on the
recommendations they receive from their assistants,
just as a Supreme Court Justice must act on the cases
that come before him or her. We want Justices with
deep wisdom, with gravitas, and with an understanding
of the world. We also want a breadth of experience
represented on the Supreme Court. As you know,
Joshua, some of the great former justices served as
Attorney General or Solicitor General; some were
governors or senators; even a former President, William
Howard Taft, was appointed to the Supreme Court. In
recent years, however, a new pattern of appointments
has emerged, with a technocratic tinge: Every sitting
justice except for Justice O'Connor came to the court
after serving as a federal judge on a United States
Court of Appeals. Justices Souter and O'Connor are the

only sitting justices who have been elected to high
office. So while the training that Judge Alito received
many years ago in the Solicitor General's office is
valuable, it is no substitute for the other, perhaps
intangible, qualities that are so important in a Supreme
Court Justice.
Finally, Joshua, let me briefly address the question of
whether it makes sense to draw conclusions from Alito's
memos as assistant to the Solicitor General. I agree that
one should be careful in using these memos to predict
his future positions as a Supreme Court Justice.
Perhaps today's Judge Alito is more seasoned and
wiser than yesterday's young ambitious assistant to the
Solicitor General. On the other hand, the memos do
provide insight into his thought processes at the time,
and it is legitimate to examine his record since then and
to ask him questions designed to determine how, if at
all, his thinking may have changed over time.
This Week's Entries: Monday | Tuesday | Wednesday | Thursday | Friday
Schwartz: 1/12/06, 09:10 AM
Brian, thanks for your thoughts in your last posting. You
argue that Solicitor General's Office training is not, by itself,
sufficient to make one a good Justice. Furthermore, you say
that we want wisdom, gravitas, and an understanding of the
world on the court. I can hardly disagree with either point.
But where are those qualities to be found, and how are they
to be identified? Accordingly, I think you are undervaluing the
importance of having the technical abilities and substantive
mastery of law that Sam Alito both learned and honed in his
experience in the Office of the Solicitor General.
In addition, I find more ground to hope that, as a Justice of
the Supreme Court, Alito will display many of the qualities
that you are looking for. In this connection, I was intrigued by
your criticism in your first posting of Alito's memorandum for
the S.G. recommending against amicus participation in
Supreme Court review of Garner v. Memphis Police
Department. As you know, Brian, the Supreme Court
ultimately affirmed the 6th Circuit decision in Tennessee v.
Garner. The Solicitor General, following Alito's
recommendation, filed no brief in the case.
Intrigued by your comments about Alito's memo in Garner, I
discovered late yesterday that this memo is available online
among the documents produced by the Archives in
connection with the Alito confirmation hearings. I learned two
important things by reading Alito's 1984 memo.
The first concerns the lineup of interested players within the
government and their positions. The Office of Legal Policy, a
focus of movement conservatism within the Reagan Justice
Department, was pushing the Solicitor General to file an
amicus brief in the case in support of the Memphis Police.
The Civil Rights Division took no official position. It is pretty
clear to me that the Civil Rights Division staff wanted to
recommend participation on the other side, but that Assistant
Attorney General Brad Reynolds refused to permit the
division to make that recommendation. And the Criminal

Division opposed amicus participation, asserting that the
limitation on law enforcement created by the court of
appeals' opinion was no threat to existing federal law
enforcement practices. So, in institutional terms, what Sam
Alito did was to side with the Criminal Division against the
ideologically driven recommendation of the Office of Legal
Policy. In doing so, he at least kept the government from
actively downplaying or opposing the policy concerns that
had animated the Civil Rights Division staff position. Any
Assistant to the S.G., imbued with the traditional process
conservatism of the office, would have recommended the
disposition that Alito did. I think that relatively few would have
troubled to recognize that the case presented a morally
serious problem, and to explore that problem as Alito did.
This is the second important point that the memo reveals to
me: A careful reading of Alito's memo brought back to me
clearly why I think he in fact has the very qualities, wanted in
a Supreme Court Justice, that you describe. Let our readers
judge this 15-page memo for themselves. But for now, I just
want to record my own judgment that this was not only a
wide-ranging survey of the relevant law, but a serious
discussion of the moral and philosophical values—yes, Alito
talks explicitly in those terms in the memo—as well as the
practical considerations underlying the fleeing felon rule. I
suspect that you would have struck a different moral
balance, but Alito never even got a Civil Rights Division
recommendation elaborating the argument that the federal
government should oppose the unrestricted fleeing felon
rule. Alito overcame the voice of ideology in the Reagan
Administration and prevented the S.G. from filing a brief
supporting a position that the Supreme Court ultimately
rejected. Brian, I think there is a lot to like in what I see here!
Landsberg: 1/12/06, 01:32 PM
Joshua, supporters of Judge Alito have stressed that we
should not dwell on his positions as a young lawyer in
the Department of Justice, because much time has
passed and he was acting then as an advocate rather
than as a judge. Yet you seem to be arguing that his
experience from his days as an Assistant to the Solicitor
General reflects that he has the very qualities of
wisdom, gravitas, and understanding of the world that a
Supreme Court Justice should have. I believe that close
examination of Alito's memorandum regarding when the
police may use deadly force against a fleeing burglar
raises very troubling questions about his general
approach to sensitive issues of the balance between
law enforcement and individual rights. Here's
the memorandum I wrote in 1984. Of course, we now
have the benefit of the Supreme Court's decision in the
case, which reveals the weaknesses in the Alito
memorandum.
I believe you have accurately described the
bureaucratic scenario, Joshua. The Solicitor General
had received one ideologically driven recommendation
to support the police right to use deadly force against a
fifteen year old unarmed fleeing burglar. He had
received another recommendation to stay out of the
case, since federal law enforcement agencies would not
use deadly force in such circumstances. The Civil

Rights Division had not made a formal recommendation,
but Alito had a Civil Rights Division staff memorandum
that argued that the arbitrary use of deadly force, not
reasonably related to a legitimate goal, is punishment
and therefore is forbidden by the due process clause.
The Civil Rights Division has the responsibility of
prosecuting law enforcement officers who willfully
deprive individuals of life or liberty without due process
of law, so the case potentially affected an important
Department of Justice program.
The Alito memorandum brushes off the Civil Rights
Division staff recommendation in one brief paragraph.
Its reasoning on this point is very weak and distorts the
Civil Rights Division staff position. Alito argued: "If
shooting a fleeing felony suspect is punishment, ... then
such a suspect may never be shot." But the Division
attorneys had referred only to "arbitrary" shootings that
were "not reasonably related to a legitimate goal." I
would think that we want Supreme Court Justices
whose opinions accurately portray and respond to the
positions of the parties. This paragraph does not do so.
Most of the Alito memorandum discusses the Fourth
Amendment. I acknowledged in my response that he
had provided a "thoughtful and complete review of the
weaknesses of the Court of Appeals" analysis.
However, I pointed out several shortcomings of the Alito
Fourth Amendment analysis. The Supreme Court
ultimately ruled, contrary to Alito, that the shooting
violated the Fourth Amendment. Alito argued that killing
a fleeing felon was not a "seizure". The Supreme Court
ruled that it was. Most remarkably, he argued that "the
state is justified in using whatever force is necessary to
enforce its laws." This position would entirely eviscerate
the Fourth Amendment's requirement that the seizure
be "reasonable," as the Supreme Court subsequently
held.
Joshua, I agree that Alito resisted the ideological
recommendation to file a brief supporting the use of
deadly force. However, what is troubling is the
insensitivity to individual rights in his legal analysis. Part
of the Supreme Court's job is to protect individuals from
government intrusions into individual rights. If we are to
look to Alito's experience in the Solicitor General's office
as a clue to what kind of justice he would be, this
memorandum seems very troubling indeed.
This Week's Entries: Monday | Tuesday | Wednesday | Thursday | Friday
Schwartz: 1/13/06, 08:23 AM
Brian, you are quite right to detect a subtle tension among
some of the arguments made in favor of Judge Alito. Of
course, not all of these arguments are ones that I have made
and some are ones that I would not embrace. Obviously,
Judge Alito's confirmation may be supported from a number
of perspectives, just as it could be opposed from varying
perspectives. Nonetheless, I think I should try to confront
your point head on in this, my final posting.

To be sure, I have argued that some of Alito's critics have
unfairly criticized him on the basis of some of the memos he
wrote, including some that he wrote as an Assistant to the
Solicitor General. But my point never was that nothing can
be learned from memos of this kind. Instead I have tried to
explain that these memos have to be put in an institutional
context, as I tried to do for the Garner memo that we have
already discussed. One thing that I learned from Garner was
that Alito found a way to avoid advocating the position
ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court and thus reined in
a piece of the ideologically-driven agenda of the Reagan
Justice Department. And although I understand that you
disagree with Alito's moral and philosophical calculus
in Garner, I invite our readers to see for themselves whether
they do not agree that his memo shows him to be a subtle
and serious "judge" of the relevant considerations.
Similarly, I think it significant that in his much-discussed
memos Alito opposed taking the extreme positions favored
by certain Reagan political appointees on both the overruling
of Roe v. Wade and on official immunity for illegal
wiretapping. These suggest to me a tendency to seek a less
extreme position than ideological warriors on the right might
prefer, even though Alito may personally have substantial
sympathy for the objectives of
the right in these cases.
Please note that unlike some of the liberal friends of Judge
Alito, I am not suggesting here, and have never suggested,
that he is not quite conservative in his judicial philosophy.
That he surely is. But I am suggesting that his memos
demonstrate that while he shares some of the values of the
contemporary conservative legal movement, he also shows
an adherence to a different set of genuinely conservative
values: gradualism, incrementalism, respect for precedent,
concern about unintended consequences, and opposition to
judicial activism. There is lot to like and respect in those
values and they are likely to have the practical effect of
moderating Alito's positions on a wide range of hot-button
issues. In sum, I think Alito's memos provided significant,
though subtle, evidence that he is was likely to be—as he
has in fact been on the bench—a judicial conservative in
both of these significantly different senses.
In case it is not obvious why this matters, let us talk for a
moment, in closing, about Roe v. Wade. Although I have
absolutely no private knowledge of this matter, I think it is
certainly likely that Sam Alito still believes that Roe was
wrongly decided as an initial matter. As you know, Brian,
many quite liberal law professors who are pro-choice as a
matter of policy have great difficulty with the judicial activist
aspect of Roe that almost surely troubles Alito. (Many in this
liberal crowd also believe that the overruling of Roe might be
one of the best possible things that could happen for the
political fortunes of the Democratic party.) At the same time,
Alito's process-oriented conservatism reassures me that he
would think long and hard before ever voting to
overrule Roe. I expect he would be inclined to find ways to
avoid addressing that issue unless it were unavoidably
squarely presented; he would not reach out to confront the
issue. And you know well, Brian, how much flexibility the
Supreme Court has to avoid sensitive matters when it wants

to.
And were the issue about Roe ever squarely and
unavoidably presented, I suspect Alito would lose a lot of
sleep in deciding how to vote. Here's my final point: If we
were not—almost all of us—so sure that our own positions
on Roe, whatever they are—are the only tenable ones—isn't
that exactly what you would want in a Supreme Court
Justice?
Landsberg: 1/13/06, 06:49 PM
Joshua, we seem to agree on one basic point: Judge
Alito's experience in the Solicitor General's office sheds
light on his likely general approach to deciding cases,
but does not tell us a lot about how he would decide a
particular substantive issue. Even though the Solicitor
General has sometimes been called the Tenth Justice,
both the Solicitor General and Assistants to the S.G.
ultimately function as attorneys for a client. While the
client is the United States, the interests of the client are
generally identified by looking to the policies of the
president. A justice, on the other hand, has no client.
Judge Alito has testified that as a judge he puts his
personal ideology aside and tries to rule based on the
law and the facts. There is no reason to question that
testimony. So I am not suggesting, for example, that if
the issue of shooting a fleeing suspect were to come
before the court again, a Justice Alito would take the
same position that he took as an assistant to the
Solicitor General.
My deeper concern, Joshua, is what the Alito
memorandum about the Garner case shows about his
likely general approach to deciding cases. As you point
out, there is much to applaud in his memorandum, since
he does resist the ideological agenda that one group of
Justice Department lawyers urged on him. However, if
that memorandum is typical of his general approach,
there is also much to trouble us. The memorandum
represents more than the conservative values you
mention of gradualism, incrementalism, respect for
precedent, concern about unintended consequences,
and opposition to judicial activism. It is an example of
rationalizing an archaic and outmoded rule, while giving
short shrift to the value of individual life, rejecting the
carefully considered positions of the American Law
Institute, and ignoring changes in our society. Although
the court has said the concept of reasonableness found
in the Fourth Amendment requires balancing of values,
the Alito memorandum elevates the value of
questionable law enforcement techniques that federal
law enforcement agencies had rejected. At the same
time, it places little value on the individual's right to be
free from arbitrary deprivation of life.
Finally, you pose the question of what we should predict
about Judge Alito's approach to Roe v. Wade if he
becomes Justice Alito. I agree that he is unlikely to use
a blunderbuss to blast Roe out of the judicial canon.
However, this is one area where he is also unlikely to
simply accept the status quo. Rather, using those
conservative values of gradualism and incrementalism,

we are likely to see him nibble away at the foundations
of Roe. I'm sure you recall, Joshua, that the NAACP
was unable to overturn Plessy v. Ferguson's separate
but equal doctrine overnight. Its litigation gradually
eroded the foundations of that doctrine, and
eventually Brown v. Board of Education held the
doctrine was wrong. The question that troubles
supporters of Roe is whether Judge Alito will contribute
to its erosion if confirmed. If enough decisions
undermine Roe, is it not likely that at that point a Justice
Alito will say that the Constitution does not recognize a
woman's right to choose? Perhaps he would lose some
sleep in the process, as you suggest. But if, at the end
of that night, individual liberties lose out to governmental
power, women will take no comfort from his
sleeplessness. It seems clear that for many of Judge
Alito's supporters and many of his opponents, it is the
substance of the law, not the process by which it is
determined, that is driving the debate.

